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Can Section 1983 Help To Prevent the Execution of
Mentally Retarded Prisoners?
Texas death-row inmate Henry Skinner, having long maintained his
innocence, asked federal courts to order new DNA testing of preserved crime-
scene evidence. In March 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Skinner need
not seek DNA testing through a petition for habeas corpus, and could assert his
claim in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 instead.'
Habeas corpus is the federal statutory remedy for unlawful detention
pursuant to a state court judgment.' State prisoners seeking release on
constitutional grounds typically petition for habeas relief. The federal habeas
statute requires prisoners to exhaust all available state remedies first,' and it
bars federal courts from granting relief unless state courts acted unreasonably
when they previously heard the claim.4 But a state prisoner's unlawful
detention is also a "deprivation" of his rights under color of state law, for
which 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 would seem to authorize remedies.' Section 1983 has
1. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
2. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(a) (20o6).
3. Id. 5 22 5 4 (b)(1)(A).
4. Id. 5 2254(d). Though it actually bars federal relief in many cases instead of permitting it
after deferential review of state court conclusions, this restriction is conventionally described
as a requirement of "deference." See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2265
(2010).
5. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488 (1973); see also 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 ("Every person
who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... ,subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
.. .
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no requirements of exhaustion and deference.' Thus, to prevent prisoners
from using the civil rights statute as an end run around the habeas statute, the
Court has established a boundary between the two.
In Skinner, the Court relied on precedent holding that a claim must be
brought exclusively in habeas if "judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence."7 Actions that
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, even if
they succeeded, are "allowed to proceed" under § 1983 instead.' The majority
reasoned that Skinner would only obtain DNA testing if he prevailed and that
DNA testing could just as easily incriminate as exonerate him. 9 Thus, because
granting Skinner the remedy he sought would not necessarily invalidate his
sentence or conviction, the Court held that his claim was cognizable under
5 1983 and did not need to be raised in a habeas petition."o
But Skinner had previously sought DNA testing in state court and lost."
And if testing yielded his desired result, his conviction would surely rest on
shaky ground. Thus, the dissent feared that Skinner could have far-reaching
consequences, positioning 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an alternative avenue to federal
post-conviction relief-without the habeas statute's "proper respect for state
functions." Justice Thomas complained that the Court had provided a
"roadmap for any unsuccessful state habeas prisoner to relitigate his claim
under § 1983." 13 Envisioning a flood of litigation, he asked, "What prisoner
would not avail himself of this additional bite at the apple?"1 4
This Comment identifies a new role for § 1983 in post-conviction litigation.
Many prisoners may try to use § 1983, and it may prove generally valuable in
imposing greater fairness and uniformity in state post-conviction proceedings."
6. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005).
7. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994)).
8. Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).
9. See id.
lo. Id.
n1. See Skinner v. State, 293 S.W. 3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Skinner v. State, 122 S.W. 3 d
8o8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).




is. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the -labeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 85 (2012).
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But it is a particularly good fit for a group that desperately needs a new
pathway to relief: mentally retarded death-row inmates."6
In theory, under Atkins v. Virginia," persons with mental retardation may
not be executed. In practice, they can be. Ineffective trial counsel may fail to
recognize mental retardation or properly develop a claim. State-law definitions
of mental retardation may be confusing or inconsistent with clinical science. A
meritorious claim asserted in habeas may be dismissed because it is
procedurally defective.' 8 Indeed, these obstacles may be mutually reinforcing.
The consequence is that mentally retarded persons can rather easily end up
being executed even though the Constitution forbids it. The failure of habeas
to prevent the deaths of death-ineligible offenders is a serious moral and
constitutional problem that demands a solution.
I argue that Skinner invites § 1983 challenges to deficient state procedures
for adjudicating mental retardation. Such actions could bring meritorious
Atkins claims into federal court outside the deferential habeas framework. I
focus on Texas, not only because it is by far America's most active death
penalty jurisdiction," but also because its state-law standard for mental
retardation is unusually arbitrary and clinically unsound.2 o I will (1) analyze
Skinner's importance; (2) describe how Texas wrongly evaluates Atkins claims
and why meritorious claims often fail; and (3) explain how a civil rights action
might work and might help.
I. SKINNER
There were two holdings in Skinner, which together make clear that state
procedural rules in capital cases are susceptible to 5 1983 challenges.
16. Advocates prefer "intellectually disabled" to "mentally retarded" because of the stigma
associated with the latter term. The former American Association on Mental Retardation
(AAMR) is now the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.
See About Us, AAIDD, http://www.aamr.org/content 2383.cfm?navlD=2 (last visited Oct.
19, 2011). Reluctantly, for the sake of consistency with relevant case law, this Comment uses
the outdated term.
17- 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
18. See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligiblity and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 330 (2010).
ig. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited
Dec. 12, 2011).
20. For a state-by-state overview of the implementation of Atkins, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 721, 724-29 (20o8). See also infra note 57.
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First, Skinner's claim was not jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.2 ' By federal statute, only the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments. Thus, federal district courts have no
jurisdiction to review state court judgments." Rooker and Feldman bar actions
in which "[t]he losing party in state court filed suit in a U.S. District Court
after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state
court judgment and seeking federal-court review and rejection of that
judgment."'
Skinner moved for post-conviction DNA testing under a Texas statute
authorizing it if the prisoner met certain conditions." He lost when the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals found that he failed to meet those conditions." He
then filed his § 1983 action against the district attorney who had custody of the
evidence he wanted to test, alleging a due process violation. Thus, Skinner
appeared to be challenging an adverse decision of Texas's highest criminal
court in federal district court-precisely what Rooker-Feldman disallows. His
attorneys clarified, however, that he was challenging Texas's "post-conviction
statute 'as construed' by the Texas courts," rather than the adverse judgment
itself." Thanks to this maneuver, Skinner cleared the Rooker-Feldman bar."
Rooker-Feldman is surely relevant to post-conviction litigation under 5 1983,
for there is only a reason for a federal suit if the state court judgment is adverse.
But Skinner shows how to steer clear of it: challenge the rule that governs the
decision, not the decision itself.
The second holding was that Skinner need not petition for the writ of
habeas corpus and could instead seek remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Its
21. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) ("Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. . .
23. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005).
24. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011).
25. Id. at 1295 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.o1(b) (Vernon Supp. 2010)).
26. Id. (citing Skinner v. State, 293 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
27. Id. at 1296.
28. Id. at 1297-99. Skinner's § 1983 complaint was perhaps deliberately unclear in pleading
which state actor was responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. Texas invoked
Rooker-Feldman, leading the district court to note this ambiguity. See Skinner v. Switzer,
No. 2:09-CV-o281, 2olo WL 273143, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2010) (finding that Skinner
had raised some claims not barred by the doctrine but might have also "assert[ed] additional
claims" that would be barred). Thus, the prominence of Rooker-Feldman may be in part a
contingent feature of this particular lawsuit.
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simple logic was discussed above. A habeas petition is the proper way to
challenge the fact or duration of one's confinement, 9 or to advance collateral
claims that "necessarily imply the invalidity of [one's] conviction or
sentence.""o An action seeking DNA testing, if successful, simply yields testing,
which does not "necessarily" invalidate a conviction because its results are
uncertain."
Technically, then, Skinner straightforwardly applied existing precedent.
But Skinner's suit differed from other post-conviction claims that the Court
has previously found cognizable under 5 1983. Those actions have challenged
state parole proceedings, 3 prison disciplinary proceedings that result in the
loss of good-time credits, 4 and the particular drug cocktail used in a lethal
injection." If successful, those § 1983 actions would yield new administrative
proceedings or execution protocols, which might, in turn, result in a prisoner
being released earlier or killed by a different method. Either way, their ultimate
outcome would be consistent with the initial sentence. Skinner's § 1983 action,
however, falls just one step short of challenging the original judgment itself. If
Skinner is ultimately successful in his § 1983 action, he only gets DNA testing.
But if the DNA testing "succeeds," his conviction and sentence will be
effectively invalidated. *
Even if it merely applied precedent, therefore, Skinner brought 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 one step closer to the goal that capital post-conviction litigants usually
seek to achieve through habeas: overturning the death sentence.
II. ACTUALIZING ATKINS
In Atkins litigation, Texas death-row inmates with plausible claims of
mental retardation have an exceedingly difficult task. Atkins left it to the states
to define mental retardation, 3 and Texas botched it.
29. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).
30. Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994).
31. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298-99.
32. See id. at 1298 ("Measured against our prior holdings, Skinner has properly invoked
S 1983.").
33. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (zooS).
34. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
35. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (20o6).
36. He would still need to file a habeas petition using the new evidence if the prosecutor did not
agree to his release.
37. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
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The Atkins holding relied on a trend of new state laws prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded persons." Many of them used the American
Association on Mental Retardation's (AAMR) definition of mental retardation,
which had three prongs: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning;
(2) related limitations in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation before age
eighteen.3 ' Before Atkins, the Texas legislature had passed such a bill, but
Governor Rick Perry vetoed it.40
Defining a legal bright line between persons who are and are not mentally
retarded is undoubtedly difficult. IQis the most common standard measure of
intellectual functioning.41 Different IQtests produce varying scores; every IQ
score has a built-in margin of error; and, because IQscores are relative, old
scores are lower than they appear because humanity performs better on IQ
tests over time.42 Thus, even using the most widely accepted objective metric,
the boundary between intellectual disability and intellectual normality will
always be hazy. Yet Atkins at least relied on a widely accepted clinical
definition.43 Many states then implemented it by statute, but Texas did not.'
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) tried to fill the void. The CCA
held that the AAMR definition, codified elsewhere in Texas statutes, would
3s. See id. at 314-17.
39. Id. at 308 n.3. Though the AAMR is now the AAIDD, its definition of mental retardation
remains essentially the same. See FAQon Intellectual Disability, AAIDD, http://www.aamr.org/
content_104.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
40. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3 d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
41. See, e.g., Marko Wilke et al., Bright Spots: Correlations of Gray Matter Volume with IQin a
Normal Pediatric Population, 20 NEUROIMAGE 202, 202 (2003).
42. The rise in IQscores over time is known as the "Flynn Effect," and its practical import in
capital cases is that old IQscores should be adjusted downward. See James R. Flynn,
Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ and the Flynn Effect, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
170 (20o6). Courts have varying, if generally circumspect, attitudes toward its use. Compare
Walker v. True, 399 F.3 d 315, 322-23 (4 th Cit. 2005) (finding lower court error in failing to
consider Flynn Effect evidence), with Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) ("We have previously refrained from applying the Flynn effect,. . . noting that it is an
'unexamined scientific concept' .... (quoting Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W. 3 d 151, 166 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007))). For an extensive and favorable discussion of the Flynn Effect in a
federal death penalty case, see United States v. Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857-62 (E.D. La.
2010).
43. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
44. For the details, see Sarah Gail Tuthill, Comment, The Texas-Size Struggle To Implement
Atkins v. Virginia, 14 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 145 (2007).
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govern Atkins claims unless the Texas legislature decided otherwise.4 5 At the
same time, however, it noted that limitations in adaptive behavior are
"subjective," and that Atkins claims are prone to dueling expert testimony.46 As
a result, the CCA listed "evidentiary factors" to aid the factfinder in evaluating
mental retardation." These factors include whether the person's family and
friends thought he was mentally retarded during childhood; whether he
formulates and executes plans; whether he responds appropriately to stimuli
and coherently to questions; whether he lies effectively; and whether his capital
crime required forethought and "complex execution of purpose.""'
These "Briseno factors" are simply made up.4" They diverge wildly from the
clinical definition of mental retardation that they ostensibly illuminate. For
instance, mental retardation is defined by adaptive limitations, or what a
person cannot do, but Briseno asks whether he can plan, lie, and answer
questions.so This focus on strengths rather than limitations prejudices the
defendant. Unless a person is so severely intellectually disabled as to be almost
nonfunctioning, the State will always be able to point to some clinically
irrelevant thing he does well as "evidence" that he is not mentally retarded."
What a person's friends thought about his mental capabilities, moreover, has
no bearing on the underlying reality. And perhaps most important, asking
whether the defendant's crime required forethought invites reflection on the
offense's brutality rather than the offender's cognitive limitations. That juries
often decide Atkins claims at trial in Texas simply exacerbates these flaws, as
45. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3 d at 8 (discussing the AAMR definition and section 591.003(13)
of the Texas Health & Safety Code); see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(13)
(West 2010).
46. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3d at 8.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8-9.
49. See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra note 18, at 353 ("no scientific or clinical content"); Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 20, at 728 ("not grounded in professional practice or guidelines").
so. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, OfAtkins and Men: Deviations
from Clinical Definitions ofMental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 689, 712 (2009).
si. See, e.g., Neal v. State, 256 S.W. 3d 264, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that defendant
wrote a poem depicting himself as a lion); Hall v. State, 160 S.W. 3d 24, 31 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004) (en banc) (noting that defendant taught a coworker how to bag groceries and
"ordered his own meal (fried catfish) and appeared to utilize eating utensils in a normal
manner").
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jurors often believe that a person who is "really" mentally retarded should
appear more far severely disabled than he will."
While the Briseno factors were originally framed as a way to distinguish
mental retardation from personality disorder," they have essentially become
the definition of mental retardation in Texas capital cases. In adjudicating and
reviewing Atkins claims, Texas courts routinely test evidence against them."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit described the Briseno factors as
"definitions of mental retardation" under Texas law." The consequence is that
Texas makes it very difficult for a person who is truly clinically mentally
retarded to be found legally mentally retarded in a capital case.6
As a result, many death-row prisoners leave Texas courts with strong
Atkins claims." The odds that a federal court will take corrective action are
52. See, e.g., Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Jury Pool Members' Beliefs About the Relation Between
Potential Impairments in Functioning and Mental Retardation: Implications for Atkins-Type
Cases, 34 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2010); Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded:
Capital Jury Selection for the Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia,
57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701 (2008). Though defendants may move for a pre-trial judicial hearing,
the Atkins issue is a question of fact that often goes to the jury. See, e.g., Williams v. State,
270 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). There is no right to jury determination of an Atkins
claim, however, so a judge will decide it when it is raised in state or federal habeas. See Ex
parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 1o; see also Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7-8 (2005) (holding
that there is no federal right to a jury determination of an Atkins claim because Atkins left
implementation to the states).
53. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8.
54. See, e.g., Ex parte Woods, 296 S.W. 3d 587, 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (finding it significant
that defendant's teachers did not consider him mentally retarded); Ex parte Modden, 147
S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ("We will review the record and apply the criteria
we adopted in Briseno.").
55. Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 164 (5th Cit. 2006).
56. See MARK D. CUNNINGHAM, EVALUATION FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING 24 (2010) (stating that
Texas takes a "far more restrictive view of the behavioral features of death-excludable
mental retardation"). Of course, as some courts have noted in rejecting Atkins claims, Atkins
does not require that the legal definition of mental retardation match the clinical one or that
courts defer to psychologists. See, e.g., United States v. Bourgeois, C.A. No. C-o7-223, slip
op. at 47-48 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2011). But it is entirely possible for courts to rely on their
own independent judgment rather than clinicians', while still evaluating Atkins claims in a
fashion consistent with the widely agreed-upon meaning of mental retardation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 611 F. Supp. 2d 472 (D. Md. 2009).
57. A handful of other states also rely upon a judicial definition of mental retardation in the
absence of legislative action. See, e.g., Exparte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *4
(Ala. Oct. 22, 2010) (noting that "the Alabama legislature has not yet enacted legislation"
implementing Atkins). And the CCA is not the only state court to err by considering an
offender's capacity for untruthfulness and criminal behavior in evaluating his Atkins claim.
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slim. First, procedural obstacles may get in the way. Prisoners have only a
one-year period to file a federal habeas petition," and they have no right to
appointed counsel." Inept counsel may have failed to raise the claim at trial or
in state habeas, precluding the prisoner from raising it in federal habeas.60
Second, even if a prisoner brings a procedurally valid federal Atkins claim,
the federal habeas statute's restriction of federal courts' remedial powers may
sweep Briseno's faults under the carpet. Relief may not be granted in federal
habeas unless the state court judgment was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States."6 ' Thus, when Atkins claims get past
procedural hurdles and into federal court, the question is whether the Texas
courts unreasonably applied Atkins in determining that the prisoner is not
mentally retarded."
As long as federal post-conviction Atkins litigation remains exclusively
within habeas, then, Briseno will only be evaluated under this deferential
framework, if at all. Consequently, despite its deep and obvious flaws, the de
facto rule governing mental retardation claims in Texas capital cases has not
really faced direct constitutional scrutiny in federal court.
III. A WAY FORWARD
Fortunately for the integrity of the system, Skinner provides a basic
blueprint to challenge Briseno under § 1983 instead. This strategy offers an
alternative for prisoners whose federal Atkins claims, while meritorious, are
procedurally defective or unlikely to succeed under deferential review.
See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 876 (Ga. 2003). Yet the Briseno factors seem
unique in their formality, detail, and consistent application.
58. See 28 U.S.C. 5 22 4 4 (d)(1) (2006).
5g. There is generally no federal constitutional right to appointed counsel for discretionary
post-conviction proceedings, whether in capital or noncapital cases. See Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 1o (1989); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 586 (1982) (per
curiam); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 610 (1974).
6o. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (strictly limiting a federal habeas petitioner's ability to develop
the factual basis for a claim through an evidentiary hearing).
61. Id. § 22 54 (d)(1).
62. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (O'Connor, J.) ("[A] state-court decision
involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court identifies the
correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of
the particular state prisoner's case.").
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A. The Skinner Model
Say that a Texas death-row prisoner sues in federal court to invalidate the
rule under which Texas courts found him not to be mentally retarded. He
might seek a temporary injunction preventing the warden from carrying out
his execution - in effect, a stay of execution - until a new Atkins hearing is held
under a different rule. Is his claim cognizable under § 1983?
Under Skinner, the answer is yes. In Texas, as in other states, prisoners
asserting Atkins claims have the burden of proving that they are mentally
retarded." If the prisoner's action succeeds, the state court judgment that he is
not mentally retarded would be invalidated. But the death sentence itself would
not, for the prisoner has simply restored the status quo ante. He is
presumptively not mentally retarded until he proves otherwise. He may be
entitled to a new hearing on mental retardation, but that new hearing is just
like DNA testing: it cannot "necessarily" invalidate his sentence because its
results are uncertain.
Texas might point out that if the prisoner's action succeeds, it is prohibited
from effectuating its death sentence until rehearing of the Atkins claim. But this
concern applies equally well to Skinner, where it never came up. If Skinner
ultimately prevails in his § 1983 suit, and Texas's denial of access to DNA
testing is found to have violated his constitutional rights, then his sentence also
cannot be executed until DNA testing occurs. If mere delay invalidates a death
sentence, Skinner should have come out the other way.
Thus, our prisoner should not have trouble stating a cognizable claim
under § 1983. At first glance, though, he may have a Rooker-Feldman problem.
Like Skinner, the prisoner is suing in response to an unfavorable state court
judgment. Skinner circumvented this issue by challenging not the judgment,
but the rule governing it. Here, however, the governing rule is Briseno, a state
court decision. Skinner's easy avoidance of Rooker-Feldman - challenging the
statute, authoritatively construed by the judgment, not the judgment -
becomes trickier when there is no statute, but instead a judicially created rule.
Fortunately, there are good solutions.
First, Rooker-Feldman only applies when the "losing party in state court"
alleges injury arising from the adverse state court judgment.6' Briseno is the
state court decision injurious to our prisoner, but he is not a party to it. He
complains not of the judgment itself, but of its application as a rule in another
case. Thus, Rooker-Feldman would not bar his claim. It might still seem
63. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
64. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005).
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unusual that judicial action would form the basis for a § 1983 claim. The action
under color of state law that gives rise to the prisoner's complaint, however, is
not Briseno, but his detention under sentence of death. He is not suing the
judge but the prison warden or some other executive official responsible for his
detention.6' The question is merely whether judicial action can give rise to the
constitutional violation, to which the answer is: of course.
Second, our prisoner might mimic Skinner in a slightly different fashion by
arguing that the use of the Briseno factors in his case is actually the
authoritative construction of a statute. Briseno, after all, purported to hold that
Texas will "follow" the AAMR definition, which was codified in section
591.003(13) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, in adjudicating Atkins
claims. 6' The Briseno factors were just evidentiary aids employed in service of
the statutory definition -meaning that, whenever they are used, they might be
said to construe the statute itself.
Either way, Rooker-Feldman should not jurisdictionally bar his claim.
B. The Claim
The prisoner can state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over
which a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction. But what is the
claim? He might plead that the Briseno factors violate the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishments or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The Eighth Amendment claim would, of course, rely heavily on Atkins.
While Atkins authorized the state-by-state free-for-all that produced Briseno, its
thrust is that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of persons with
65. Section 1983 actions are commonly brought against executive officials to enjoin them from
implementing another actor's unconstitutional scheme. Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
537, 541 (1964) (seeking injunction against future elections until legislature reapportioned
itself). The statute also contemplates actions for declaratory relief against judges. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable"); see also Kampfer v.
Scullin, 989 F. Supp. 194, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining this provision). A judge is
absolutely immune from suits for damages arising from actions taken in his judicial capacity
in matters over which he has jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 363-64
(1978). Venue may be an important consideration in choosing which executive official to
sue.
66. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3d at 8; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
67. The Eighth Amendment is incorporated against Texas by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
prisoner might also advance a separate procedural due process claim.
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mental retardation." One federal appeals court has recently pointed out that
the discretion afforded to states by Atkins is limited: states may only "enforce"
the prohibition on executing the mentally retarded, not undermine it.6 ' Thus,
if a procedure for adjudicating mental retardation claims "necessarily will result
in the execution of the mentally retarded," it violates the Eighth Amendment.7 0
Briseno is such a procedure because it is simply too arbitrary to identify who is
actually mentally retarded. The claim might also rely on the basic principle of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that cruel and unusual punishments are
defined by society's "evolving standards of decency."7 ' The majority of post-
Atkins implementing statutes suggests a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded persons, especially those who satisfy the clinical definition of
mental retardation.
The prisoner might also advance a due process challenge, as Skinner did.72
The Supreme Court has previously derived special procedural requirements for
death penalty cases from the Due Process Clause. Here, one might simply
argue that Briseno is arbitrary, and that the gravity of the circumstances
requires greater accuracy than Briseno affords in determining who is mentally
retarded. Or, more narrowly, the prisoner might argue that Briseno's actual
holding -that Texas will apply its statutory definition of mental retardation to
Atkins claims - gives Atkins claimants a liberty interest in being evaluated
according to this definition.7 The factfinder's use of the Briseno factors, which
obscure the statutory definition itself, arbitrarily deprives the prisoner of this
liberty interest.7s
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
69. See Hill v. Schofield, 6o8 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding unconstitutional Georgia's
requirement that mental retardation be proven beyond a reasonable doubt), rev'd sub nom.
Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
70. Id. at 1274.
71. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
72. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
73. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (establishing that a capital
defendant is entitled to jury instruction on ineligibility for parole when his future
dangerousness is at issue in sentencing).
74. Skinner argued that the Texas post-conviction DNA testing statute gave prisoners who had
not sought DNA testing at trial a liberty interest in obtaining it on collateral review, but that
the statute as authoritatively construed by the CCA made it effectively impossible for these
prisoners to obtain testing, thus depriving them of the liberty interest they had been
granted. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1296.
75. Cf Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974) (holding that prisoners may not be
arbitrarily deprived of their statutory liberty interest in good-time credits).
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Whether these claims might succeed is uncertain. But, even if § 1983
actions cannot ultimately topple Briseno, they can still achieve important
benefits. Briseno can be undone by legislative action any day. New litigation
might draw attention to the problem. It also opens up the possibility of
evidentiary hearings that may help the prisoner. And it might at least compel
the federal judiciary to assess Briseno directly, affording a full and fair hearing
to an important federal constitutional question.
CONCLUSION
The intersection of habeas corpus and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lies deep in the
procedural weeds, but it has grave human consequences.
On June 21, 2011, Texas executed Milton Mathis. Though Texas courts
found him not to be mentally retarded, he probably was. He had scored 62 and
64 on IQ tests while incarcerated, well below the threshold for mental
retardation of 70.76 Yet no federal court ever reached the substantial merits of
his Atkins claim, which was caught in a bizarre procedural snafu that led to its
dismissal." If the constitutional prohibition against executing mentally
retarded persons is to have real meaning, federal courts must actually be able to
prevent such executions. With habeas as his only federal recourse, Milton
Mathis was killed.
Texas law virtually guarantees that there will be another Milton Mathis,
and soon. After Skinner, perhaps § 1983 could provide the relief the
Constitution demands.
DOUG LIEB
76. In re Mathis, 483 F. 3 d 395, 397 (5 th Cir. 2007).
77. Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3 d 461, 465-66, 476 (5 th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1574
(2011).
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